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Aborts during the critical ascent flight phase require the design and operation of Orion 
Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) systems to escape from the Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) 
and return the crew safely to the Earth.  To accomplish this requirement of continuous abort 
coverage, CEV ascent abort modes are being designed and analyzed to accommodate the 
velocity, altitude, atmospheric, and vehicle configuration changes that occur during ascent.  
Aborts from the launch pad to early in the flight of the CLV second stage are performed 
using the Launch Abort System (LAS).  During this type of abort, the LAS Abort Motor is 
used to pull the Crew Module (CM) safely away from the CLV and Service Module (SM).  
LAS abort guidance and control studies and design trades are being conducted so that more 
informed decisions can be made regarding the vehicle abort requirements, design, and 
operation.  This paper presents an overview of the Orion CEV, an overview of the LAS 
ascent abort mode, and a summary of key LAS abort analysis methods and results.  
 
Nomenclature 
 
Symbols 
α = angle of attack 
Aref = vehicle reference area 
Cm = pitching moment coefficient 
Cmα =  static longitudinal stability ∂Cm/∂α 
h = altitude 
lref = vehicle reference length 
M = Mach number 
Maero = dimensional aerodynamic pitching moment 
Mmax = ACM maximum thrust moment 
Midpt = midpoint of a line 
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qbar = dynamic pressure 
Tmax = ACM maximum thrust 
xACM = thrust vector x-coordinate location 
xCG = center of gravity x-coordinate location 
 
 
 
Acronyms 
ACM = Attitude Control Motor 
ADL = Abort Decision Logic 
AGL = Above Ground Level 
AM = Abort Motor 
AoA = Angle of Attack 
AOA = Abort Once Around 
API = Application User Interface 
ATO = Abort To Orbit 
BPC = Boost Protective Cover 
CEV = Crew Exploration Vehicle 
CG = Center of Gravity 
CIAT = Constellation Integrated Aborts Team 
CLV = Crew Launch Vehicle 
CM = Crew Module 
DAC = Design Analysis Cycle 
DE = Due East (CLV lunar mission) 
DM = Docking Module 
GRAM = Global Reference Atmospheric Model 
HiMR = High Mixture Ratio 
HS = Heavy/Slow 
ISS = International Space Station 
KSC = Kennedy Space Center 
LAS = Launch Abort System 
LAV = Launch Abort Vehicle (LAS with CM) 
LF = Light/Fast 
LES = Launch Escape System (Apollo) 
LoMR = Low Mixture Ratio 
MET = Mission Elapsed Time 
OME = Orion Main Engine 
PA-1 = Pad Abort 1 
RCS = Reaction Control System 
RSS = Root-Sum-Square 
RTAL = Retrograde Targeted Abort Landing 
SA = Spacecraft Adapter 
SM = Service Module 
TAL = Targeted Abort Landing 
UAS = Untargeted Abort Splashdown 
 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
NASA’s Vision for Space Exploration calls for a long term exploration of the Moon, Mars, and beyond, with a 
focus on returning astronauts to the Moon by 2020.  These goals require the development of a new spacecraft – the 
Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV)1.  One of the primary design drivers for the CEV is to ensure crew safety.  
CEV requirements specify that abort capability should be continuously available from the launch pad until the 
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mission destination is reached.2  Aborts during the critical ascent flight phase require the design and operation of 
CEV systems to escape from the Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) and return the crew safely to the Earth. 
Ascent phase aborts are characterized by large changes in vehicle altitude, large amplitude attitude maneuvers, 
and large vehicle center-of-gravity movement; and pose significant engineering challenges.  Several ascent abort 
modes are being designed and analyzed to accommodate the velocity, altitude, atmospheric, and vehicle 
configuration changes that occur during ascent3.  These modes provide abort coverage extending from the launch 
pad until the CEV achieves a sustainable orbit.  Analyzing these modes involves an evaluation of the feasibility and 
survivability of each abort mode and an assessment of the abort mode coverage using the current baseline vehicle 
design.  Factors, such as abort system performance, concept of operations, crew load limits, thermal environments, 
crew recovery, and vehicle element disposal are investigated to determine if the current vehicle requirements are 
appropriate and achievable4,5,6. 
Abort from the launch pad to early in the flight of the CLV second stage are performed using the Launch Abort 
System (LAS).  During this type of abort, the LAS abort motor is used to pull the Crew Module (CM) safely away 
from the CLV and Service Module (SM).  LAS aborts are characterized by high aerodynamic loads induced by low 
altitude maneuvers and high accelerations caused by the launch abort motor. 
This paper presents an overview of the CEV in Section II and an overview of the LAS ascent abort mode in 
Section III.  Three key LAS abort analysis methods and results are then discussed in Section IV and the paper 
concludes in Section V. 
 
 
II. Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle 
The Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) is based on a design similar to the Apollo program’s Command and 
Service Modules and is composed of four main elements: the Launch Abort System, the Crew Module, the Service 
Module, and the Spacecraft Adapter, as shown in Fig. 1.7  The Launch Abort System (LAS) provides a reliable abort 
capability for aborts that occur within the atmosphere.  The Crew Module (CM) provides a safe habitable volume for 
the crew during launch, spaceflight, and return from the International Space Station (ISS) or Moon.  The Service 
Module (SM) provides additional resources necessary to support the primary mission, including power and 
maneuvering capability.  The SM is also used to provide abort capability for exo-atmospheric aborts.  The 
Spacecraft Adapter (SA) provides the interface between the spacecraft and the Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV).  The 
term Launch Abort Vehicle (LAV) will be used to refer to the LAS and CM together, prior to jettison of the LAS. 
As shown in Fig. 2, the LAV consists of an Abort Motor to provide the CLV to LAV abort separation function, 
an Attitude Control Motor (ACM) to provide attitude and rate control, and a jettison motor for CM to LAS 
separation.  The ACM consists of a throttle-able solid rocket system.  The LAS also provides a Boost Protective 
Cover (BPC) that shields the CM from debris and the aero-thermal environment during ascent. 
In addition to its nominal mission 
functions, the SM also provides abort 
capability during the high altitude portions of 
the CLV launch profile.  The SM contains 
two propulsion systems: the Service Module 
Orion Main Engine (SM OME) (used for 
large maneuvers, such as orbit changes and 
re-entry) and the Reaction Control System 
(RCS) (used for fine control, such as 
proximity operations and docking, as well as 
providing a backup for the OME)8.  For LAS 
assisted aborts, the LAV separates from the 
SM at the SM-CM plane.  In the event of a 
CLV problem after nominal jettison of the 
LAS, the SM OME and RCS thrusters can be 
fired to maneuver the CEV to safety. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle. 
 
 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
3
III. CEV Ascent Abort Mode Overview 
The CEV system is required to provide a launch abort 
capability from the launch pad after CM hatch closure 
throughout the CLV ascent until orbital insertion.  The 
possible reasons for an ascent abort fall into one of three 
general categories: (1) a partial or total loss of CLV 
propulsion, (2) a loss of CLV control, or (3) a systems 
failure, either on the CLV or CEV, which results in the 
inability to safely achieve orbit.  Several abort modes are 
required to accommodate the velocity, altitude, atmospheric, 
and vehicle configuration changes that occur during ascent.  
These modes provide abort coverage extending from the 
launch pad until the CEV achieves a sustainable orbit. 
Mode I aborts, also referred to as Launch Abort System 
(LAS) aborts, are performed using the LAS and remain a 
viable option until the LAS is nominally jettisoned early in 
the CLV second stage burn.  During Mode I aborts, the LAS 
abort motor is used to pull the Crew Module (CM) away 
from the CLV and Service Module (SM).  Mode I aborts are 
characterized by high aerodynamic loads induced by low 
altitude maneuvers and high accelerations caused by the 
launch abort motor.  LAS aborts may be commanded via the 
ground-based health management system, the on-board CEV 
Abort Decision Logic (ADL), the crew, or ground personnel. 
Mode II aborts, also referred to as Untargeted Abort Splashdown (UAS) aborts, do not utilize the LAS.  Instead, 
the CLV upper stage engine is shut down and the SM Reaction Control System (RCS) is used to provide adequate 
clearance between the CLV and CEV.  Once the CEV is sufficiently far away from the launch vehicle, the CM 
separates from the SM, and then the CM is maneuvered for a guided re-entry, and descends using parachutes to a 
safe landing location. 
Mode III aborts, commonly known as Targeted Abort Landings (TAL), are triggered by late second stage 
failures where the CEV trajectory is modified via a targeted SM OME burn followed by a CM guided entry to a 
target landing site.  The goal of these trajectory control efforts is to select a landing site that maximizes the chances 
of crew survival and recovery, while also meeting crew loads and SM thermal constraints. 
The last type of abort mode is Mode IV, which is an Abort To Orbit (ATO).  This mode describes cases where 
an abort is performed following a premature shutdown of the upper stage when the SM has sufficient capability to 
achieve a safe orbit insertion and de-orbit burn.8 
 
 
Figure 2.  Elements comprising the Orion 
Launch Abort Vehicle (LAV). 
Launch Abort System Aborts 
Launch Abort System (LAS) aborts, or Mode I aborts, are performed using the LAS and remain a viable option 
until the LAS is nominally jettisoned at a pre-designated point during the flight of the CLV second stage.  The 
current CEV design uses an active LAS approach that stabilizes and reorients the capsule during the launch abort 
maneuver using an Attitude Control Motor (ACM) in the escape tower (Figure 3). This approach differs from the 
passive approach used on Apollo which relied upon the use of open-loop timers to control the abort event 
sequencing along with a passive canard that was deployed to reorient the vehicle to a heat-shield forward attitude 
following the escape motor firing and a brief coast period.  The Apollo Launch Escape System (LES)9 is shown in 
Figure 4.  The passive Apollo system required approximately 1,000 pounds of ballast to ensure aerodynamic 
stability during the escape motor firing and coast, and the passive canard system could produce tumbling in some 
portions of the envelope before settling into a heat-shield forward attitude. 
The use of the active LAS on the CEV eliminates both the ballast required to ensure passive aerodynamic 
stability in the nose-forward orientation as well as the open-loop pitch motor weight included in the passive Apollo.  
A feedback control algorithm is currently under development that issues commands to the ACM system to stabilize, 
pitch, and reorient the LAV during the abort.  The current concept controller uses a proportional/integral/derivative 
(PID) approach to control attitudes and rates of the LAV. 
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Figure 3.  CEV Launch Abort System Abort Scenarios. 
 
The concept of operation and event sequencing during an abort varies with altitude.  The LAS aborts are divided 
into three regimes by altitude above ground level (AGL) at abort initiation as follows: Low: 0 to 25,000 feet; Mid: 
25,000 feet to 150,000 feet; High: 150,000 feet to nominal LAS jettison (See Figure 3).  The sequence of events 
during an abort is based on abort initiation 
altitude, time elapsed from abort initiation, and 
estimated dynamic pressure and Mach number. 
 
Figure 4.  Apollo Launch Escape System (Ref. 9). 
Once an abort condition is detected, the abort 
motor and ACM are ignited.  After the abort 
motor burns out (approximately 4 seconds), the 
vehicle continues on a controlled coast trajectory.  
The ACM provides the control during abort motor 
operation and coast to maintain nose-forward 
flight.  The reorientation maneuver is initiated at 
an elapsed time between 8 and 15 seconds to 
orient the LAV with the heat-shield into the 
velocity vector, assuring proper attitude for 
parachute deployment and, from high altitudes, 
proper thermal protection system (TPS) 
orientation.  The ACM is used to track the 
reorientation maneuver command.  Following 
reorientation, the ACM is used to stabilize the 
LAV until the LAS is jettisoned from the CM 
using the Jettison Motor. 
There is a water landing depth and impact 
velocity requirement that the trajectory must 
achieve at LAS jettison to ensure a successful 
chute deployment and water landing following a 
pad abort.  To achieve these requirements in the 
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case of a pad abort, a pitch maneuver must be performed during the abort motor burn, so that the abort motor thrust 
is directed along the proper trajectory.  The brevity of the abort motor firing period means that the pitch maneuver 
must be fairly abrupt if it is to be effective in directing the abort trajectory.  The high rates and attitudes of the pitch 
maneuver in the pad abort regime make it one of the more demanding of all the abort cases in terms of the authority 
required from the ACM.  Sufficient control authority must be provided to ensure that the LAV does not tumble due 
to abort motor thrust misalignments or aerodynamic uncertainties during this portion of the abort. 
IV. LAS Ascent Abort Design Analysis 
Launch Abort System abort performance analysis involves an evaluation of the feasibility and survivability of a 
LAS abort using the current baseline vehicle design.  These studies and design trades are being conducted so that 
more informed decisions can be made regarding the vehicle requirements, design, and operations.10  Examples of 
three analyses being used to assess LAS abort flight dynamic performance are: Launch Abort System Performance 
Analysis, Launch Abort System Static Controllability Envelope Analysis, and Launch Abort Vehicle Tip-Off 
Conditions Due to Crew Launch Vehicle Failures and Dispersions.  Summaries for these three analyses are 
described in the sections below. 
A. Launch Abort System Performance Analysis 
This study examined the performance and controllability of the current Launch Abort System abort configuration 
(LAV), which includes an extended aerodynamic faring that shields the CM from debris and the aero-thermal 
environment during ascent.  The controllability analysis includes a survey of non-dispersed aborts conducted at 
regular intervals along a nominal CLV ascent trajectory, as well as Monte Carlo dispersed aborts conducted from the 
launch pad, maximum dynamic pressure, and high altitude abort flight conditions. 
The analysis was performed using the ANTARES simulation with a rotating, oblate Earth model.11 ANTARES is 
a code that uses the Trick Simulation Environment for defining and tying together various dynamical and 
environmental models, written in either C or FORTRAN, for 6-DOF simulation execution.  The simulation also used 
the GRAM-99 atmospheric model, including GRAM-99 winds for mid and high altitude abort regimes.12 For pad 
aborts, the 1840 KSC winds profile set was used.  All simulations were run from initiation of the abort up to the 
drogue chute deployment. Simulation runs were terminated at drogue chute deployment, and several flight condition 
performance metrics were applied at this point. The forward bay cover (FBC) jettison and drogue chute deployment 
events were not modeled in the simulations. Neither the potential for recontact of the CM and the LAS during the 
LAS jettison event, nor transient forces and moments that may be imparted to the CM as a result of the LAS jettison 
were included in this study. Since all simulation runs were terminated at the initiation of the drogue deployment, no 
portion of the drogue or main chute deployment sequence was included in this study. 
The simulation activity was divided into two parts.  The first part took the form of an abort trajectory survey, 
where a series of aborts were simulated from regularly-spaced altitude intervals (1000 feet), from 300 feet up to 
300,000 feet.  No dispersions were applied in this survey; all model and system parameters were maintained at their 
nominal values.  Also, no winds were applied in the survey simulations.  The controller performance was then 
evaluated in terms or attitude, attitude rate, Mach number and dynamic pressure throughout the abort maneuver.     
For the second part, the simulation analysis consisted of Monte Carlo dispersions for three abort scenarios:  1) at 
the pad; 2) at maximum CLV dynamic pressure; and 3) at high altitude (i.e., at altitudes near the expected LAS 
jettison point from a nominal ascent trajectory).  The perturbations in this Monte Carlo analysis included the 
following system parameters: 1) LAS abort motor mis-alignment and thrust level output (due to temperature 
variation); 2) LAS ACM and abort motor points of action; 3) aerodynamic data; and 4) LAS and CEV mass 
properties (i.e., mass, inertia and center of mass locations); 4) variations in atmospheric properties (provided by 
GRAM-99); and 4) variations in initial abort flight conditions. Performance metrics were then assessed for each 
abort scenario. 
 
 
1. Relevant Performance Metrics 
The performance metrics that are prescribed for the abort are intended to ensure that controlled flight is 
maintained, that structural constraints are observed with respect to aerodynamic loading, and that the CM is left in a 
flight dynamic condition that is appropriate for successful drogue deployment following the LAS jettison event. 
These performance metrics take the form of limits that are applied to allowable variations in angle of attack, 
sideslip, body rates, dynamic pressure, and Mach Number values at certain points along the simulated abort 
trajectory. Some key performance metrics being assessed are as follows: 
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Angle of attack (α) and sideslip angle (β) must satisfy: 
• Maintaining nose-forward flight prior to start of reorientation maneuver 
• At drogue deployment (2-seconds after LAS jettison),  
140 degrees  ≤ α  ≤ 210 degrees 
-40 degrees  ≤ β  ≤ 40 degrees 
 
Magnitudes of rotational roll, pitch, and yaw body rates (p, q, r) were evaluated over a 2-second interval prior to 
drogue chute deployment, with success criteria: 
Max. |q|, |r| ≤ 40 deg /sec 
Max. |p| ≤ 80 deg /sec 
Max. (q2 + r2)½  ≤  40 deg /sec 
 
Dynamic pressure (qbar) and Mach number (M) at drogue deployment must satisfy: 
10   ≤  (qbar)  ≤ 160 pounds per square foot (psf) 
M ≤ 0.9 
 
Throughout the maneuver, an aerodynamic loading constraint is applied: 
   (qbar )*( αtot )  ≤  17,000 psf-degrees  
 
 
 
2. Results/Discussion 
The results for the controllability analysis are presented in this Section. The abort trajectory survey results are 
presented first, followed by Monte Carlo analysis of a pad abort. 
 
Abort Trajectory Survey 
The results of the abort trajectory survey are shown in this section.  For this analysis,  a series of aborts were 
simulated from regularly-spaced altitude intervals (1000 feet) (from 300 feet up to 300,000 feet) along a nominal 
CLV trajectory. The presentation of the data has been divided into three categories, based upon initial abort altitude 
regimes:  Low, from 0 to 25,000 feet; Mid, from 25,000 to 150,000 feet; and High, from 150,000 feet. and above.  
Figures 7 – 9 show the aerodynamic angle, body rate, and Mach and dynamic pressure time histories for the Low 
abort regime. 
 
 
  
Figure 7:  Aerodynamic angles in Low abort regime. 
 
Figure 8:  Body rates in Low abort regime. 
 
From the angle of attack plot in Figure 7, it can be noted that all the trajectories in this Low abort regime 
successfully perform the abort reorientation maneuver to the heatshield forward attitude.  The sideslip and bank 
angle time histories indicate a switch in their behavior as the abort altitude increased.  For initial abort altitudes 
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above 9,000 feet, the LAV rolled during the Abort motor burn; and the sideslip angles peaked above 10 degrees.  
However, these sideslip excursions settled before the start of the reorientation maneuver.  The attitude and body 
rates post-LAS jettison were well within acceptable levels for drogue chute deployment for all abort trajectories in 
this Low altitude regime.  Similarly, the Mach and dynamic pressure data, shown in Figure 9, indicate that these 
values also satisfied their respective drogue deployment performance metrics.  
Figure 10 plots the altitude versus the total range (as measured from the abort initiation for each trajectory) 
values at LAS jettison. Note that the effect of the sideslip excursion starting at aborts above 9,000 feet and below 
17,000 feet tended to reduce net ranges.  
 
  
Figure 9:  Mach number, dynamic pressure, and   
velocity in Low abort regime. 
Figure 10:   Altitude vs. range from abort initiation. 
 
 
The abort survey performance results for the mid altitude abort regime are presented in Figures 11 – 13. The 
reorientation maneuver generates large amounts of overshoot for many of the lowest altitude aborts in this regime 
due to the high dynamic pressure at which the maneuver is initiated. The reorientation must begin no later than 15 
seconds into the abort in order to stabilize the LAV in the heat-shield forward attitude before the ACM propellant is 
depleted.  At high dynamic pressure,  larger aerodynamic torques are produced as the LAV breaks out of the nose-
forward attitude generating much higher pitch rates during the maneuver, resulting in more overshoot of the 
commanded reorientation attitude.  Larger sideslip angle excursions are also apparent during the reorientation, again 
owing to the higher dynamic pressure.  However, even with the higher aerodynamic moments encountered during 
this high dynamic pressure abort regime, the ACM settled the LAV to acceptable attitude and attitude rate levels 
around the LAS jettison point. 
 
 
  
Figure 11:  Aerodynamic angles in Mid abort regime. Figure 12:  Body rates in Mid abort regime. 
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Figure 13:  Mach number, dynamic pressure, and velocity in Mid abort regime. 
 
 
 
Finally, Figures 14 – 16 show the High altitude abort regime performance results.  Far less variation in the 
dynamic response of the system is observed for aborts in this regime due to the much lower dynamic pressures at 
which the aborts are conducted. Figure 16 shows that dynamic pressure was less than 60 psf throughout all aborts in 
this regime. The angle of attack time histories show that the reorientation maneuver starts at 8 seconds, since the 
dynamic pressure criteria was already less than 100 psf at the beginning of the reorientation time window. Positive 
control of rate and attitude is exhibited throughout the abort since the ACM control authority is sufficient to 
overcome all aerodynamic torques. 
The build-up of body rates in the roll and yaw axes after the LAS jettison point may be attributed to the CM RCS 
activity.  In the ANTARES simulation, 3-axes CM RCS control was active post-LAS jettison, switching to the entry 
controller.  Further analysis must be done to determine the reason for this RCS activity, as the vehicle attitude and 
rates appear to be well within acceptable levels pre-LAS jettison.    
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 14:  Aerodynamic angles in High abort 
regime. 
 
Figure 15:  Aerodynamic angles in High abort 
regime. 
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Figure 16:  Mach number, dynamic pressure, and velocity in High abort regime. 
 
 
 
Monte Carlo Simulation Results – Pad Abort 
Simulation time histories produced by the 1840-run Monte Carlo dispersions for the KSC pad abort are shown in 
Figure 17. The angle of attack time histories illustrate that no runs tumbled or failed to reorient properly. The 
maximum sideslip angles are around 10 degrees in these cases, and this does not appear to jeopardize the success of 
the reorientation maneuver or the ability to achieve a successful LAS jettison.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 17:  Pad abort Monte Carlo aerodynamic angle time histories. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Shortly after the LAV reorientation maneuver in a pad abort, the LAS is jettisoned at an elapsed time of 21 
seconds, and the crew module (CM) experiences approximately two seconds of open-loop flight prior to drogue 
deployment. Tolerances on angle of attack and sideslip of the CM have been specified for successful drogue 
deployment. The allowable angle of attack range is between 140 and 210 degrees, and the sideslip range is between 
+40 and -40 degrees. Dispersion results for the angle of attack and sideslip of the CM at the approximate time of 
drogue deploy are shown in Figure 18, with the prescribed tolerances indicated as a green box. 
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Figure 18:  Pad abort dispersion plots of angle-of-
attack vs. sideslip of CM at the approximate drogue 
deployment point. 
 
Figure 19:  Pad abort maximum CM pitch rates 
observed during the time period between LAS jettison 
and drogue deployment. 
 
•   well within limits 
*   close to limits 
X   exceeded limits 
 
  
Figure 20:  Pad abort maximum CM roll rates 
observed during the time period between LAS 
jettison and drogue deployment. 
 
Figure 21:  Pad abort maximum CM yaw rates 
observed during the time period between LAS 
jettison and drogue deployment. 
 
•   well within limits 
*   close to limits 
X   exceeded limits 
 
 
Acceptable ranges for angular rates of the CM have also been defined for the period of flight between LAS 
jettison and drogue deployment. The magnitudes of pitch and yaw rates must be less than 40 degrees per second 
(deg/sec), and roll rate magnitudes must be less than 80 deg/sec. Figure 19 shows the largest pitch rates that 
occurred for each run between LAS jettison and drogue deployment.  Most runs were well with the pitch rate limit. 
Only seven runs have rates close to the limit (i.e., within 10 deg/sec).  Figure 20 shows the analogous plot for roll 
rates of the CM. Roll rates were well within acceptable limits. Recall, the maximum allowable roll rates were set at 
±80 deg/sec, instead of the ±40 deg/sec prescribed for pitch and yaw rates.  Figure 21 shows maximum yaw rate 
excursions.  Only three out of 1840 rates approached the designated drogue chute rate limits. 
The last two drogue chute condition performance metrics, which concerns the dynamic pressure and Mach 
number values, are plotted in Figure 22.  No excursions beyond the limits of these parameters were encountered.   
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The aerodynamic loading metric is examined next. A constraint on aerodynamic loading is placed on the LAV 
flight condition expressed as a limit on the product of dynamic pressure (qbar) and total angle of attack. The 
maximum allowable product is 17,000 psf-deg.  Figure 23, shows the product time traces during the first ten seconds 
of the abort maneuver.  The peak values occurred after 2.5 seconds (towards the end of the Abort Motor burn). None 
of the peak values exceeded the dynamic pressure total angle of attack product limit.   
 
 
Figure 23:  Pad abort dispersion plots of dynamic 
pressure x total angle-of-attack of the LAV for the 
first ten seconds of the abort. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22:  Pad abort dispersion plots of dynamic 
pressure vs. Mach number of CM at the 
approximate drogue deployment point.
 
B. Launch Abort System Static Controllability Envelope Analysis 
A static controllability tool was created to provide a visual means of assessing the controllability of the LAV.  
The tool consists of a series of MATLAB® m-files and uses simulation time histories and the LAV aerodynamics 
database to produce animated plots of the vehicle’s angle of attack versus dynamic pressure trajectory plotted over 
regions identified as stable or unstable and controllable or uncontrollable.  The tool is being used to investigate the 
flight dynamics characteristics of two LAV design configurations at various abort conditions.  A preliminary 
analysis of the two configurations provides explanations for behaviors seen in simulated trajectories and a first look 
at comparing the controllability of the two vehicle configurations. The configurations considered in this study 
included a passive canard deployed to assist in the LAV reorientation maneuver (maneuver to transition from nose 
forward to heat-shield  forward flight). 
 
 
Cm
α
“restoring” region
“stable”
region
unstable
trim point
unstable
trim point
stable
trim point
 
 
Figure 24.  Illustration of definitions of stable and restoring regions for pitching moment (about the center of 
gravity) versus angle of attack. 
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The controllability plots 
include two key regions – stability 
and controllability.  The two 
regions are defined in the pitch 
plane only and are determined 
using static aerodynamic 
coefficients.  There are two 
approaches to determining the 
limits of the pitch-plane stable 
region.  The first is to find a stable 
trim point and the range of angle 
of attack around that trim point 
where Cmα is negative.  An 
alternate definition of this region 
exists and can be useful in some 
cases.  For each angle of attack, if 
the pitching moment is such that is 
returns the vehicle to a nose-
forward state, then the vehicle is 
defined as stable.  If the vehicle’s 
tendency is to orient to a 
heatshield-forward state, then the 
vehicle is defined as unstable.  The 
two methodologies produce 
different stable region boundaries, 
but both are acceptable as long as 
the chosen definition is 
understood.  For the analysis 
presented here, the latter-defined 
“stable” region is referred to as a 
“restoring” region.  A difficulty in 
defining the restoring region is that 
it can only be used for showing 
nose-forward stability.  When the 
vehicle performs the reorientation 
maneuver to a heatshield-forward 
position, the definition of restoring 
would have to change.  Since one 
of the goals of this tool is to show 
the reorientation of the vehicle to a 
heatshield-forward position, the 
former definition of stability is 
chosen for this tool.  Figure 24 
illustrates the described methods to 
determine whether a moment is 
stable or restoring. 
Three options for displaying 
stable regions are provided by this 
tool: 1) no stability display (to emphasize controllability region), 2) stable region defined by negative Cmα about a 
trim point, or 3) stable and unstable trim points shown by horizontal lines on the plot.  Examples of the latter two 
options are shown in Figures 25a and 25b, respectively.  More details on the figures are described later in this 
section. 
 
Figure 25a.  Example plot with stable region defined by negative Cmα 
about a stable trim point. 
 
 
 
Figure 25b.  Example plot with stable and unstable trim points shown by 
lines. 
 
 
The first step in determining the controllable region is to determine the dimensional aerodynamic pitching 
moment (about the center of gravity) over the angle of attack – dynamic pressure space. An example of the absolute 
value of the computed dimensional aerodynamic pitching moment is shown in Figure 26. 
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The ACM maximum thrust moment is found by multiplying the maximum thrust that the ACM can produce at a 
given time by the distance from the center of gravity of the vehicle to the ACM thrust vector at a given time, shown 
in Eq. (1). 
)(maxmax CGACM xxTM −=    (1) 
Comparing the maximum thrust 
moment to the aerodynamic moment 
over the angle of attack – dynamic 
pressure space determines whether the 
vehicle is statically controllable or 
uncontrollable.  If the aerodynamic 
moment is larger than the ACM 
maximum moment, then the vehicle is 
uncontrollable, and vice versa. 
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Figure 26.  Contour plot example of absolute value of dimensional 
aerodynamic pitching moment over angle of attack – dynamic 
pressure space. 
The controllability plot is animated 
over the span of the LAV’s trajectory 
from abort initiation until tower 
jettison and includes the entire angle 
of attack range that the vehicle 
experiences during flight.  A still-
frame image of the tool output after 
completing a simulated pad abort is 
shown in Figure 27.  In the animations 
produced by the tool, there are several 
important factors that influence the 
regions.  The vehicle center of gravity, 
Mach number, canards, ACM jet 
interaction effects and abort motor jet 
interaction effects are all influencing 
the pitching moment.  The vehicle 
center of gravity and ACM maximum 
thrust over time are influencing the 
ACM maximum thrust moment.  The 
abort motor and ACM jet interaction 
effects affect the controllability 
envelope because they may increase or 
decrease the pitching moment for 
certain angles of attack.  The white 
lines in the uncontrollable region 
appear after the initial decrease in 
maximum ACM thrust from 7,000 to 
2,500 pounds at 6 seconds after abort 
initiation and show where the 
controllable region boundary would be 
if the ACM was still producing the 
maximum 7,000 pounds of thrust. 
 
 
Figure 27.  Still frame image of animated controllability tool. 
The event indicators are another 
feature of the tool that consist of 
circles that are initially black and turn 
a different color when a particular 
event happens.  The color change of 
the circle corresponds to a change in 
trajectory line color on the plot, as can 
be seen in Figure 27.  The noted events 
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are the decrease in ACM thrust, initiation of reorientation with the ACM, and deployment of the canards.  The 
reorientation initiated with the ACM and the deployment of the canards often happens at the same time, as can be 
seen by the red color overlapping the blue on the trajectory line for the pad abort case in Figure 27.  The circle on 
the trajectory line is where the vehicle is currently at during the animation, while the line left behind shows where 
the vehicle has been. 
Instantaneous values of time in seconds, angle of attack (AoA) in degrees, Mach number, dynamic pressure 
(qbar) in psf, abort motor thrust as a percent of maximum thrust (AM % Thrust), and center of gravity location in 
both x and z directions in inches are shown.  The arrows next to each of those values indicate whether the particular 
value is increasing or decreasing 
at a particular time in the vehicle’s 
trajectory.  A straight line 
indicates that the value is 
constant. 
The last section appearing on 
the right side of the controllability 
envelope plot includes the version 
of the aerodynamics database 
(0.31 in this example), as well as 
check marks to indicate that the 
abort motor and ACM jet 
interaction effects are included in 
the determination of the 
controllability regions.  Cross 
symbols appear if those effects are 
not included. As shown in Figure 
25, the legend updates according 
to the option of stability the user 
has chosen to view. 
 The controllability envelope 
tool was used to assess the flight 
dynamics of both the operational 
LAS configuration and the Pad 
Abort 1 (PA-1) flight test vehicle 
configuration. The PA-1 flight test 
configuration is based on an 
earlier baseline configuration that 
has higher drag than the current 
configuration. A preliminary 
analysis of these two 
configurations shows not a large 
difference in their respective 
controllable regions.  Both 
configurations stay within the 
controllable region for the 
nominal pad abort case.  The 
largest difference is observed in 
the angle of attack versus dynamic 
pressure trajectories for the two 
configurations plotted on top of 
the controllable regions and is 
seen best in the maximum 
dynamic pressure abort regime.  
Figures 28a and 28b show the last 
frame of the animations for a 
maximum dynamic pressure abort 
for both configurations. 
 
Figure 28a.  Last frame of maximum dynamic pressure abort for flight 
test vehicle configuration. 
 
 
Figure 28b.  Last frame of maximum dynamic pressure abort for 
operational vehicle configuration.
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For the maximum dynamic pressure abort case, both configurations enter the uncontrollable region during the 
vehicle reorientation.  This explains why neither vehicle can reorient at its commanded rate in the maximum 
dynamic pressure abort regime leading to overshoots of the commanded angle of attack.  There is not enough ACM 
control authority to overcome the static aerodynamic moment.  However, both vehicles have a stable trim point and 
a large statically stable region for the heatshield-forward attitude that is keeping them from tumbling even when they 
are in a statically uncontrollable state. 
There is also a noticeable difference in canard deployment time.  The canards are commanded to deploy when 
the dynamic pressure of the vehicle falls below 100 psf.  The drag modeled in version 0.31 of the aero-database is 
lower for the operational vehicle configuration than the flight test vehicle configuration.  This difference between 
the two configurations causes the flight test vehicle to slow down faster than the operational vehicle, leading to an 
earlier deployment of the canards, prior to reorientation, for the flight test vehicle.  The operational vehicle deploys 
its canards after the vehicle has completely reoriented.  During the reorientation, the drag difference also causes the 
operational vehicle to go farther into the static uncontrollable region leading to greater overshoot of the commanded 
angle of attack as can be seen in Figure 28. 
The tool can also be used to investigate the cause of an unsuccessful abort.  For example, an abort may fail 
because the vehicle unintentionally tumbles after initiating an abort and before the vehicle was intended to reorient.  
The controllability tool can show whether the vehicle entered an uncontrollable and unstable region during this 
event. 
 
C. Launch Abort Vehicle Tip-Off Conditions Due to Crew Launch Vehicle Failures and Dispersions 
The LAV is required to be capable of successfully aborting from the launch pad up until the LAS is nominally 
jettisoned at a pre-designated point during the flight of the CLV second stage. This study examined dispersed CLV 
trajectory data sets (dispersed Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) ascent trajectories and CLV failure trajectories.) to 
determine the range of potential LAV tip-off conditions (initial conditions at LAS abort initiation). The results of 
this study are used as abort initial conditions to assess LAS abort performance, such as in the abort trajectory survey 
study described earlier   In the following, the abort envelopes are presented, along with the methods and 
assumptions used to obtain them. 
The most current set of CLV trajectories analyzed is labeled Design Analysis Cycle 2, Revision 4 (DAC-2 
Rev4).  There are nine no-failure dispersed CLV trajectories.  Each dispersion set consists of 2,000 runs.  The 
simulations were performed with the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) 6 degree-of-freedom simulation 
MAVERIC (Marshall Aerospace Vehicle Representation in C).  
The nine no-failure trajectory sets analyzed are as follows: 
 
1) Heavy/slow due east February mission with launch at close of launch window and high second stage 
mixture ratio (HS DE Feb Close HiMR) 
2) Heavy/slow due east February mission with launch at close of launch window and low second stage mixture 
ratio (HS DE Feb Close LoMR) 
3) Heavy/slow due east February mission with launch at opening of launch window (HS DE Feb Open) 
4) Heavy/slow International Space Station (ISS) February mission with launch at opening of launch window 
and high second stage mixture ratio (HS ISS  Feb Open HiMR) 
5) Heavy/slow ISS February mission with launch at opening of launch window and low second stage mixture 
ratio (HS ISS Feb Open LoMR) 
6) Light/fast due east February mission with launch at close of launch window (LF DE Feb Close) 
7) Light/fast due east July mission with launch at opening of launch window (LF DE July Open) 
8) Light/fast ISS August mission with launch at close of launch window (LF ISS Aug Close) 
9) Light/fast ISS August mission with launch at opening of launch window (LF ISS Aug Open) 
 
Due east indicates that the CLV trajectory is designed for a lunar mission, while ISS indicates that the trajectory is 
designed to go to the ISS.  Heavy/slow and light/fast denote the weight and speed of the vehicle. The second stage 
mixture ratio refers to the CLV J2X engine mixture ratio of fuel to oxidizer being lower or higher than average. The 
nominal LF ISS Aug Open trajectory parameters for the portion of flight where the LAS is still attached to the 
integrated stack are presented in Figure 29. 
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Figure 29.  Nominal LF ISS Aug Open CLV trajectory while LAS is attached. 
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Figure 30.  Abort Envelopes for Monte Carlo No-Failure Trajectories. 
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For the no-failure dispersed trajectories, boundaries were placed around each of the nine sets by finding the 
minimum and maximum value of a particular condition at a given altitude step along the trajectories.  Since the 
trajectory data is at a constant time step, not altitude step, each condition occurs at a different altitude value.  Since 
there were not any discontinuities between each time step for the conditions along the trajectories, the conditions 
were interpolated to get values at desired altitude steps.  Then the minimum and maximum values were found at 
each altitude step along the trajectories.  In addition, an envelope was created around the conditions to include the  
trajectories from all nine Monte Carlo sets.  To minimize the number of points defining each envelope, the 
envelopes were produced by hand-picking points from plots of all the trajectories.   
Envelopes were produced for the following abort conditions versus altitude: time, angle of attack, sideslip angle, 
roll rate, pitch rate, yaw rate, Mach number, dynamic pressure, velocity, flight path angle, heading angle, bank 
angle, latitude, and longitude.  The velocity is the relative magnitude accounting for winds. 
The maximum and minimum limits for some of the conditions for each of the nine sets of dispersed CLV 
trajectories are shown in Figure 30.  The bold green and red lines are the boundaries encompassing all nine of those.  
The green line represents the maximum of all of the dispersed data, and the red line represents the minimum of all of 
the dispersed data. 
 The failure trajectory data was produced by simulations performed with MAVERIC.  Simulated failures were 
engine nozzle actuators that failed in either the rock or tilt directions.  Rock and tilt are 45 degrees offset with 
respect to the body axes, so a failure in either affects both pitch and yaw of the vehicle.  The actuators locked (stuck) 
into one of three positions: in place, at null, or at hard-over. Locked at hard-over denotes that the actuator becomes 
locked at its maximum deflection level of ± 4 degrees. 
There are eleven sets of Monte Carlo trajectories with 2000 simulated failures that were initiated randomly 
throughout a given time frame.  Six of these examined the maximum dynamic pressure (qbar) time frame, and five 
examined the entire first stage of flight.  Nine of these eleven dispersed sets are based on the LF ISS Aug Open CLV 
mission.  The types of failures simulated in these dispersions are shown in Table I.  The other two, one each from 
the maximum qbar time frame and the entire first stage, are based on the LF DE Feb Close CLV mission.  These 
two dispersion sets simulate a lock in place rock and tilt actuator failure. 
The LAS is responsible for 
aborting from the CLV in the 
event of a failure until nominal 
LAS jettison, which includes 
first stage burn and the first 30 
seconds of second stage burn.  
However, failure trajectory data 
is only available for the first 
stage of the CLV, which 
corresponds to an altitude of 
about 210,000 feet depending on the mission.  The abort conditions considered thus far begin at an altitude of 2,000 
feet and do not include pad abort conditions.  Little abort condition information due to failures is available below 
2,000 feet. 
Table I. Failure types for dispersed CLV trajectory sets. 
Maximum q  Time Frame First stage of flight 
Lock in place rock actuator Lock in place rock actuator 
Lock in place rock and tilt actuator Lock in place rock and tilt actuator 
Lock at null rock actuator Lock at null rock actuator 
Lock at hard-over rock actuator Lock at hard-over rock actuator 
Lock at hard-over tilt actuator  
An abort is triggered when the CLV 
exceeds any one of the following 
parameters, provided as a function of 
altitude: Y body acceleration, Z body 
acceleration, angle of attack, angle of 
sideslip, roll rate, pitch rate, or yaw rate.  
These values were provided by the 
Constellation Integrated Aborts Team 
(CIAT) and are based on maximum 
values from the nine no-failure CLV 
Monte Carlo analyses with high wind 
gusts.  A 20% margin was added for 
measured parameters and a 30% margin 
was added for angle of attack and angle 
of sideslip since they are calculated on-
board and not measured. 
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Figure 31.  Timeline of events for CLV failure and abort. 
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is 0.50 seconds.  This time starts at CLV detection of abort confirmation signal and ends with Orion’s LAS Abort 
Motor at 80% thrust.  A diagram of the timeline of events for a CLV failure and abort is shown in Figure 31. 
A MATLAB® script was written to determine the abort conditions.  At each time step, the conditions of the 
CLV as defined above are compared to the abort trigger conditions for the corresponding altitude or velocity;  0.50 
seconds after one of the conditions is exceeded, the abort conditions are captured.  In this way, abort conditions for 
every available CLV trajectory with a simulated failure are obtained. 
The failure trajectories were split into three groups: 1) actuator lock in place and lock at null for the LF ISS Aug 
Open mission, 2) actuator lock in place and lock at null for the LF DE Feb Close mission, and 3) actuator lock at 
hard-over for the LF ISS Aug Open mission.  Figure 32 is a comparison of the abort envelopes for these three cases.  
Angle-of-attack, sideslip angle, and the body rates are shown.  
Failure types other than actuator failures are also being investigated for future analysis.  One such example is a 
CLV case rupture where thrust is suddenly leaked from the side of the vehicle causing a disturbance torque.   
LAS abort performance analysis is being conducted using the abort envelopes and abort conditions described 
here to assess the vehicle’s ability to meet performance requirements.  
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Figure 33.  Comparison of abort envelopes due to failures. 
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V. Concluding Remarks 
This paper presented an overview of the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), an overview of the LAS ascent 
abort mode, and trade studies currently underway to assess abort performance and controllability.  One of the 
primary design drivers for the CEV is to ensure crew safety.  CEV requirements specify that abort capability should 
be continuously available from the launch pad until the mission destination is reached.  Aborts during the critical 
ascent flight phase require the design and operation of CEV systems to escape from the Crew Launch Vehicle 
(CLV) and return the crew safely to the Earth.  Several ascent abort modes have been designed and analyzed to 
accommodate the velocity, altitude, atmospheric, and vehicle configuration changes that occur during ascent.  
Aborts using the LAS, referred to as LAS aborts, provide abort coverage extending from the launch pad until early 
into the flight of the CLV second stage. 
Simulation studies and design trades are being conducted so that more informed decisions can be made regarding 
the vehicle requirements, design, and operations.  Examples of three analyses being used to assess LAS abort flight 
dynamic performance are: Launch Abort System Performance Analysis, Static Controllability Envelope Analysis, 
and Launch Abort Vehicle Tip-Off Conditions Due to Crew Launch Vehicle Failures and Dispersions. Summaries 
for those three analyses are described in the sections below. 
The baseline CEV has been tested with the Government and Contractor simulation tools to evaluate LAS abort 
performance and capability to meet the current CEV abort performance requirements, from launch on a typical 
mission to the ISS.   
The Launch Abort System Performance Analysis examined the performance and controllability of the current 
Launch Abort System abort configuration (LAV), which includes an extended aerodynamic faring that shields the 
CM from debris and the aero-thermal environment during ascent.  The controllability analysis included a survey of 
non-dispersed aborts conducted at regular intervals along a nominal CLV ascent trajectory, as well as Monte Carlo 
dispersed aborts conducted from the launch pad, maximum dynamic pressure, and high altitude abort flight 
conditions. LAS abort performance metrics were discussed and then assessed for each abort scenario. 
A static controllability tool has been developed to provide a way of visualizing the dynamics of different flight 
regimes and vehicle configurations and provides a way to investigate the reasons for some of the vehicle flight 
dynamics exhibited by the simulations.  The tool has already proven valuable by providing an explanation for some 
of the behaviors of the LAS in the maximum dynamic pressure abort regime, as well as showing key differences in 
the performance of the flight test vehicle and operational vehicle configurations. 
Over 40,000 CLV trajectories have been analyzed to obtain abort envelopes for the design and performance 
analysis of the LAV.  The abort envelopes were defined in groups according to the type of failure simulated.  An 
algorithm was developed to automatically create envelopes around the abort conditions for each type of failure.  
This algorithm was successful at allowing a quick definition of the abort envelopes.  An important first look at the 
worst case abort conditions for the LAV was presented, allowing analysis of the vehicle’s performance with these 
initial conditions. 
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